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Abstract
In an attempt to rebalance trade with China, the United States administration decided in 
early 2018 to introduce a series of protectionist measures affecting certain imports in 
particular. This gave rise to an escalation of US-China trade tensions. The new tariffs 
have affected a significant percentage of Chinese exports to the United States, but their 
impact on EU trade has only been marginal to date. The indirect effects on European 
economies through the global value chains have also been limited. However, possible 
tariff barriers on the automotive sector could raise the affected trade flows substantially.
Simulations made with econometric models confirm that the tariff measures adopted to 
date would have relatively moderate direct effects on global economic activity and on EU 
countries. That said, the simulations also warn that a decrease in business confidence 
and an unfavourable reaction by international financial markets could amplify such 
adverse effects. Additionally, possible future auto sector tariffs could have a significant 
impact on European economies in an industry already facing important challenges 
associated with the structural and technological transformation process currently under 
way.
Keywords: protectionism, global trade, tariffs, European Union, China, automotive 
industry.
JEL codes: F01, F40, E50, E60.
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In early 2018, the US Government started to make good on the threats to raise trade tariffs 
that had figured prominently in President Trump’s election programme. The adoption of 
protectionist measures, first mainly aimed at China, has sparked fears of a trade war and has 
since then weighed on world trade growth and corporate investment decisions. As D. Rodrik 
(2018) argues, the disruptive potential of the Trump administration’s initiative stems more from 
its unilateralism, clearly far from the rules embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
than from its quantitative significance. So far, the actions taken are considerably less important 
than, for instance, the trade measures negotiated in the 1980s by the Reagan administration.
The tariff hikes adopted to date hardly affect EU trade directly, but the deterioration of 
confidence and the higher uncertainty about the world economy could have very adverse 
indirect effects on such open economies as the European ones. Only a small portion of the 
measures ordered by the US administration to date have been directly aimed at the 
European Union. However, these tensions have adverse effects on European countries 
through the global value chains, as they reduce exports of inputs to the United States and 
other directly affected countries. Also, higher uncertainty, the loss of investor confidence 
and adverse financial market reactions would affect the EU economy through the different 
transmission channels. Lastly, the possible imposition of tariffs on cars would have very 
harmful effects on what is a key industry for several EU countries.
This article reviews the trade protectionist measures adopted by the US administration in 
2018. It then describes in greater detail the trade relations between the United States and 
the euro area. Lastly, it describes some simulations of the impact of such measures, 
focusing in particular on the euro area.
In 2018 the Trump administration began to define the trade policy agenda announced 
during the presidential campaign. Despite the emphasis on possible protectionist measures 
that characterised the campaign, no significant initiatives in this respect were adopted 
during President Trump’s first year in office (2017), aside from the US withdrawal from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade treaty between 12 Pacific countries, and the 
interruption of trade negotiations with the EU on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), a free trade agreement discussed under the Obama administration. 
However, in early 2018 the US administration began to introduce a series of concrete 
measures (see details in Table 1).
The measures adopted gave rise to immediate retaliation by the affected economies. The 
tariffs imposed in January on imports of solar panels and washing machines and the 25% and 
10% tariffs on steel and aluminium adopted in March were levied across the board. The EU, 
Mexico and Canada were granted a temporary exemption from the metal tariffs, but it expired 
in June, prompting them to adopt counter-measures for an equivalent value on exports from 
the United States. Such measures had been previously adopted by China, India and Turkey.
The escalation of tensions with China increased the risk of a trade war. In the following 
months, an investigation conducted by the US Trade Representative led to the detection 
of illegal appropriation of US technology by Chinese firms. As a result, the US administration 
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decided to impose tariffs of 25% on imports of technological goods from China. This 
measure was followed by Chinese retaliatory measures on US products for an equivalent 
value. Finally, in September the United States introduced additional 10% tariffs on import 
flows from China worth $200 billion, which also triggered retaliation.
The new tariffs affect a significant percentage of exports to the United States. The 
protectionist measures promoted by the Trump administration affect a limited, albeit 
material, percentage (13.6%) of its imports (see Chart 1). The most significant measures are 
those involving goods specifically from China (10.4%), followed by trade barriers on metals 
(2.7%), while tariffs on solar panels and washing machines only account for 0.5% of import 
flows.1 From China’s perspective, half of its exports to the United States are currently 
1  According to Bown and Zhang (2019), the percentage of US imports affected by protectionist measures imposed 
by the Trump presidency would decline to 11.2% if only import flows not subject to restrictive measures prior to 
2018 are considered. The percentages relating to metals also include tariff-exempt countries whose exports to 
the United States are subject to quantitative restrictions.
SOURCE: Author.
January 2018 30% and 50% tariffs on imported solar panels and washing machines
25% and 10% tariffs on imported steel and aluminium; temporary exemption for the EU, Mexico and Canada
Chinese retaliation on $3 billion worth of US imports (in response to metal tariffs)
May Start of US investigation into vehicle imports
June End of temporary exemption granted to the EU, Mexico and Canada regarding metal tariffs
June/July EU, Mexico and Canada adopt retaliatory measures
July Bilateral trade agreement between the United States and the EU
25% tariffs on $50 billion worth of imported technological goods from China
Chinese retaliation on an equivalent value of US imports
10% tariffs on $200 billion worth of imports from China
Chinese retaliation on $60 billion worth of US imports 
December Truce in the US-China trade war 
February 2019 US investigation into vehicle imports concludes
July/August
September
March
TIMELINE OF THE MAIN PROTECTIONIST MEASURES TABLE 1
SOURCES: PIIE, US Census and own calculations.
The protectionist measures imposed by the Trump administration currently cover a limited percentage of US goods imports, although possible additional 
tariffs could significantly raise the share affected.
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affected by special tariffs (see Chart 2). By sector, the most significant measures affect key 
products in Chinese exports, such as machinery, electrical and chemical products and 
transport, meaning that tariff barriers have risen notably (see Chart 3). Other countries 
affected by US tariffs are Russia and Turkey, owing to the importance of their steel and 
aluminium exports (17% and 13%, respectively, of their total exports to the United States).
The impact of retaliatory measures on US exports is, for the time being, limited. Those adopted 
by US trading partners involve, for now, a limited proportion of US exports (9% of the total). The 
products most penalised by the new tariffs include exports to China of electrical machinery and 
equipment, precision instruments and chemical products (see Chart 4). Also affected, although 
to a lesser extent, were sales of metal and food products to Canada, Mexico and the EU. 
Retaliatory action on certain specific agricultural products, such as soy, was very significant, 
leading to the granting of subsidies to the agricultural sector in the United States.
If the trade negotiations initiated by China and the United States in December do not 
prosper, the risk of a trade war could reignite. In December 2018, the United States and 
SOURCES: PIIE, US Census and own calculations.
The United States' protectionist measures mainly affect Chinese exports.
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SOURCES: PIIE, USITC, US Census, WTO and own calculations.
a 2017 figures.
US tariffs affect key sectors of bilateral trade with China, substantially raising tariff barriers compared with the previous ones.
UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM CHINA: MAIN SECTORS (a) CHART 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Chemical products Textiles Metals Machinery Electrical equip. Transport Instruments
 NOT AFFECTED  AFFECTED (25% TARIFFS)  AFFECTED (10% TARIFFS)
% of total imports from China
 AVERAGE TARIFFS (right-hand scale)
%
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 4 ECONOMIC BULLETIN THE LATEST PROTECTIONIST TRADE TRENDS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
China signed a temporary truce in their protectionist escalation and started negotiations to 
reach a trade agreement that will put an end to the bilateral tensions. If an agreement is not 
reached, the United States has threatened to raise the current tariffs on €200 billion worth 
of Chinese goods imports from the current 10% to 25%, and to extend the tariffs to all 
imports from China. Also unresolved is the investigation by the US Department of 
Commerce into vehicle imports, the outcome of which has not yet been published, but 
which could result in tariffs on imported vehicles and auto parts. This could have a 
significant impact on European exports. The percentage of US imports affected by the 
new protectionist measures could rise to 38% (see Chart 1). Canada and Mexico – the 
origin of 35% and 17% of US imported vehicles and auto parts, respectively – could be 
exempt from these measures under the new version of the free trade treaty between the 
three countries. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed in 
November and should protect the automotive sector from possible tariff barriers. However, 
there is still much uncertainty regarding ratification of the USMCA by the US Congress and 
the possibility of a bilateral agreement being reached with China.
The United States and Europe have very close trade links. The European Union as a whole 
is the largest export market for US industrial products, and the United States is the EU’s 
largest export market. Vehicle exports to the United States are particularly important for 
the EU (accounting for 13% of total exports to the US), while aircraft exports to the EU are 
especially significant for the United States (accounting for 10.6% of the total) (see Chart 5). 
In some sectors, such as vehicles and machinery, the United States has a considerable 
bilateral trade deficit.
The trade tariff structure between the two areas is very uneven. European Union tariffs on 
US imports are quite high for some specific products (see Chart  5), such as vehicles, 
chemical products and aircraft. This is the argument used by the US administration to 
defend the imposition of possible offsetting measures.
In 2018, the United States and the European Union agreed to progress towards a free 
trade area; this has led to a temporary truce. The agreement signed in July 2018 aims to 
eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers and to prohibit subsidies for industrial goods 
(excluding cars). The two areas also undertook to work, together with the WTO, to settle 
US-EU trade relations
SOURCES: PIIE, USITC, WTO and own calculations.
Retaliatory measures by the United States' trading partners mainly penalise the electrical equipment and machinery, chemical products, metals and 
food sectors.
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the problem of the appropriation of intellectual property rights (in reference to China) and 
to refrain from adopting protectionist measures while the negotiations are ongoing. In April 
2019 the European Commission officially approved the start of the trade talks with the US 
authorities on the creation of the free trade area. The possible obstacles for achievement 
of an agreement still include the United States’ demand that the tariff-free area should also 
include agricultural products, to which the EU is opposed. In addition, official publication 
of the findings of the investigation into the automotive sector remains pending, along with 
the US government’s decision in that respect.
To date, the direct impact on EU trade of the protectionist measures adopted by the United 
States has been only marginal, but high risks persist in the automotive sector. In particular 
the measures affect steel and aluminium exports to the United States, which account for 
just 1.7% of total exports to the United States and 0.3% of total extra-EU exports. But if 
tariffs were levied on the automotive sector, the proportion of exports to the United States 
affected by protectionist measures would rise to 14.7% (2.9% of total EU exports). As 
Chart  6 illustrates, exports of vehicles and auto parts to the United States make up a 
significant proportion of total automotive sector exports in the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Germany (18%, 14% and 12%, respectively). In other countries, the figure is much lower. 
In the case of Spain, vehicle exports to the United States account for just 1.7% of total 
sector exports.
The indirect effects through global value chains would also be limited. The Chinese 
economic sectors subject to US tariffs do not have a high national value-added content. 
Indeed, Chinese exports to the United States in these sectors have a high proportion of 
inputs from other countries, especially from other Asian economies, which means that the 
effects of US trade tariffs may also spread to those countries.2 An analysis performed 
drawing on the OECD’s statistics on trade in value-added shows that the value added by 
Impact of the existing 
measures and of a 
possible escalation in 
protectionism on 
European economies 
SOURCES: Eurostat, WTO and own calculations.
a 2017 figures.
In some of the main bilateral exports, such as machinery, vehicles, chemical products or aircraft, US exports to the EU are subject to higher tariffs than 
those levied in the United States on European exports.
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2  For example, in the electrical equipment sector, less than 50% of the value contained in Chinese exports to the 
United States is actually produced in China.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 6 ECONOMIC BULLETIN THE LATEST PROTECTIONIST TRADE TRENDS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
the EU or the euro area to Chinese exports to the United States is very limited, less than 
0.1% of GDP (see Chart 7). The textile and electrical equipment sectors are those that 
record the highest share (1% and 3% of total sector output, respectively).3
The simulations made suggest that the tariffs already adopted would have a moderate 
direct impact on global economic activity. Those made by the IMF using its global general 
equilibrium model (IMF, 2018) show that the measures currently in force would have a very 
limited impact on world GDP: a decrease of 0.11% compared with the 2019 baseline 
scenario and of 0.12% in the long term, although the effects on the United States and 
SOURCES: Eurostat and own calculations.
a 2017 figures.
For some EU members, exports of vehicles and auto parts to the United States make up a considerable proportion of GDP and of total sector exports, 
although the differences across countries are very marked.
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SOURCES: TiVa, WEO, Eurostat and own calculations.
a 2015 figures.
US-China trade tension will foreseeably have a very limited indirect impact (through global value chains) on the EU and the euro area, although certain 
countries could be more affected at a sectoral level.
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3  The analysis at a disaggregated level excludes Ireland, Malta and Luxembourg owing to measurement problems. 
As regards the value added contained in US exports to China, the contribution of EU countries is virtually zero 
(no more than 0.02% of the GDP of each individual economy or of the aggregate total).
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China would be more pronounced (see Chart 8). Although in the short term the existing 
measures could give a slight boost to European firms’ exports to the United States and 
China in the sectors affected by the bilateral tariffs, the impact on activity in the euro area 
would be very modest (0.04% in 2019) and would virtually disappear in the long term, once 
US and Chinese consumers shifted to goods produced nationally.
A similar dynamic would arise if the United States were to extend tariffs to all imports from 
China and place 25% tariffs on imports of vehicles and auto parts, followed by retaliation by 
its trading partners. Specifically, these measures would boost activity somewhat in the euro 
area in the short term (+0.18% in 2019 compared with the baseline scenario), owing to the 
higher demand for vehicles and other European products from the United States’ trading 
partners affected, which would reduce their imports from the United States in retaliation. In 
the long term the effect would be slightly negative, shaving 0.06% off euro area GDP.
The drop in business confidence and the adverse reaction of the international financial 
markets could significantly heighten the adverse effects of any measures adopted or 
The existing measures will have a minor impact on activity in the main areas. An escalation in tensions could have a more pronounced impact on growth, 
both through the trade channel and on account of the market reaction.
SOURCE: IMF.
IMPACT OF EXISTING AND POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL MEASURES
% GDP deviation from baseline scenario
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announced. Greater uncertainty regarding consumer and investor confidence and the 
financial markets would amplify the negative effects of the trade measures adopted, both 
at a global level (-0.8 pp in 2020) and on the individual economies. In the case of the euro 
area, the negative impact would be limited, even in the short term.
Tariffs on cars could have a significant impact in a sector that is already facing serious 
challenges stemming from the structural and technological transformation of the industry.
Although it is estimated that the current tariffs and possible additional measures will have 
a limited impact on aggregate euro area GDP, the effects of possible restrictions on vehicle 
imports would be more pronounced at the sector level and in certain countries. To 
investigate these impacts, the IFO Institute analysis (Felbermayr and Steininger, 2019) 
simulates a 25% US tariff on imports of vehicles and auto parts from all its trading partners, 
in a general equilibrium trade model that takes into account the European regional value 
chain structure linked to vehicle production. The findings show that, in the long term, US 
protectionist measures on vehicle imports could significantly reduce the automotive 
industry’s value added in several European countries (see Chart 9). Austria, Germany and 
Hungary, where the industry’s value added would shrink by 6.9%, 4.7% and 4.5%, 
respectively, would be among the economies most affected. This figure would be around 
3% for the European Union as a whole, which implies that the tariffs on vehicles would 
have a significant impact at a sectoral level. In Spain the effect would be more limited 
(1.7%) because although vehicles account for a considerable proportion of total exports of 
goods (17.3%), exports to the United States account for just a small fraction of that total.
The euro area is not, in principle, the main focal point of the Trump administration’s 
protectionist trade policy, which is focused primarily on China, and nor will it be heavily 
affected by the measures approved, or even by those announced to date. However, these 
measures could have a greater impact if they are accompanied by more marked effects on 
uncertainty and confidence. In addition, if the United States were to levy tariffs on the 
automotive sector, the effects through the European value chains could be more negative 
than expected, and would in any event severely impact some European countries.
Beyond the immediate macroeconomic effects, the unilateral stance adopted by the 
Trump administration makes the really crucial objective for correctly channelling future 
international trade relations more distant. This objective is none other than to adopt a set 
Final comment
US tariff barriers on imports of vehicles and auto parts would have a significant impact on the automotive industry of several EU countries.
TARIFFS ON VEHICLES: REDUCTION IN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY’S VALUE ADDED CHART 9
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of common rules to adapt trade relations to the new reality, not only in view of the growing 
weight of China in the world economy, but also on account of the technological and 
structural changes taking place in the production and trade of goods and services 
worldwide.
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